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Hayek’s Slippery Slope, the Stability of the Mixed Economy and the Dynamics of 
Rent-Seeking 
 
 
Abstract 
 
F. A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom continues to provoke intense scholarly debate focused 
on the validity of Hayek’s central claim that a mixed economy is inherently unstable and 
economic intervention will inexorably lead to totalitarianism if pursued for a sustained 
period. This article presents empirical evidence that shows conclusively that it is the 
mixed economy that has proved remarkably stable, whereas laissez-faire and totalitarian 
regimes have proved inherently unstable. It is argued that this empirical outcome can be 
explained by the dynamics of rent-seeking and Hayek’s failure to anticipate that the state 
could control more than half of national income without requiring a totalitarian apparatus 
to control and direct production and consumption. The implications of the failure of 
Hayek’s argument for our conceptualization of freedom and power in the context of the 
modern democratic state and our understanding of the relationship between economic and 
political freedom are considered.  
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Introduction  
 
In his 1944 book The Road to Serfdom, F. A. Hayek famously argued that a mixed 
economy is inherently unstable; if pursued for a sustained period economic intervention 
will inexorably lead to totalitarianism. This argument has become a leading theme in 
classical liberal thought and has generally been interpreted in the sense summarized by 
Barry (1984, p. 52) as:  
 
(T)he claim that piecemeal acts of intervention by government in a free economy 
and society will, if continued over an unspecified period of time, bring about the 
transformation of that society into a totalitarian regime in which all but the most 
trivial decisions affecting an individual are taken by the state. 
 
What might be termed the Hayekian ‘slippery slope argument’ is especially powerful in 
that it postulates that totalitarianism does not result from the sudden overthrow of a 
democratic regime by an authoritarian party or faction, but is likely to be brought about 
as an unintended consequence of successive government interventions whose proponents 
do not desire the totalitarian outcome that their actions produce.  
 
If valid, the argument logically implies that advocates of government intervention beyond 
the threshold deemed strictly necessary for the operation of a free economy are 
unwittingly pushing their society along ‘the road to serfdom’ towards totalitarianism. 
Assuming the vast majority of the advocates of government intervention do not desire a 
totalitarian society, it follows that all those who value individual liberty should support 
laissez-faire policies if the descent into totalitarianism is to be avoided. 
 
Hayek’s argument has been politically important since the book’s publication. The Road 
to Serfdom generated immediate and extended critiques from two important 
contemporary socialist thinkers: Barbara Wootton (1945) and Herman Finer (1945) who 
argued – albeit in markedly different tones – that Hayek had seriously under-estimated 
the compatibility of democracy and economic planning. The book is also said to have 
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inspired Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s ill-judged and ill-fated claim 
during the 1945 British General Election that a Labour government would require a 
Gestapo-like organization in order to put its economic plans into effect (Shearmur, 2006). 
It would go on to be an important inspiration for the new right in academia, think tanks 
and within the political parties of the right (Cockett, 1995; Shearmur, 2006). More 
recently, following the election of Barack Obama in 2008 the book enjoyed a revival after 
it was recommended by a number of American talk show hosts as a text that would 
explain the likely consequences of the new President’s social policies (Farrant and 
McPhail, 2010; Caldwell, 2011).    
 
This article seeks to confront Hayek’s slippery slope argument with the apparent 
empirical resilience of the mixed economy, to put forth an explanation for this 
discrepancy and to consider some of the theoretical and conceptual implications of the 
empirical failure of Hayek’s argument. After this introduction, the article revisits Hayek’s 
The Road to Serfdom to lay out in precise terms the original slippery slope argument and 
consider recent scholarly debates regarding the intended meaning of Hayek’s central 
argument in the book. Next, the slippery slope claim is confronted with empirical data in 
order to evaluate it from an historical perspective. Based on the findings, a possible 
theoretical explanation for the relative stability of the mixed economy and the relative 
instability of both laissez-faire and totalitarianism based upon the dynamics of rent-
seeking is put forward. The article then discusses the principal implications of the 
weakness of the Hayekian slippery slope argument for our understanding of economic 
and political freedom and the relationship between the two. A short final section 
concludes.  
 
It should be noted at the outset that there are important conceptual challenges in defining 
a mixed economy, laissez-faire and totalitarianism. Like most concepts in the social 
sciences these categories are not clear-cut and precise meanings of the terms may be 
contested. For the purposes of this article, we define laissez-faire as the classical liberal 
ideal of limited government, free trade and established political rights such as that found 
in Britain immediately following the abolition of the Corn Laws or in late nineteenth 
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century Sweden. Totalitarianism is defined as a regime in which the state controls almost 
all aspects of economic, social and political life, and where the basic rights of citizens 
may be summarily dismissed, such as in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union under Stalin. 
The mixed economy may be defined as occupying the space between laissez-faire and 
totalitarianism. It describes contemporary social democracy in which the state is a major 
economic player and basic political rights and civil liberties are respected.  
 
Hayek’s slippery slope argument in The Road to Serfdom  
 
To a significant extent the whole of The Road to Serfdom is guided by Hayek’s slippery 
slope argument. This is made clear right from the start by the title chosen for the book 
but, even more importantly, by the concerns and objectives Hayek identified as the key 
motivations for writing the book. Thus, in the preface to the 1956 edition Hayek (1994, p. 
xlii) stated: 
 
What I have argued in this book, and what the British experience convinces me 
even more to be true, is that the unforeseen but inevitable consequences of socialist 
planning create a state of affairs in which, if the policy is to be pursued, totalitarian 
forces will get the upper hand. 
 
The fact that the slide into totalitarianism is unforeseen is an important aspect of the 
argument. According to Hayek, totalitarianism does not result from deliberate action to 
achieve such an outcome on the part of those who would defend government 
intervention. Rather, the journey towards totalitarianism comes about as an unintended 
consequence of interventionist public policies, with the implementation problems raised 
by each measure requiring the further expansion of government activity until the state 
ultimately becomes totalitarian.  
 
This unfortunate and largely impersonal process is thus classified by Hayek as tragic, in 
the sense that a most undesirable outcome is brought upon by people who did not wish it 
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to come about and were mostly motivated by the best of intentions, as in the case of the 
rise of the Nazi Party in Germany: 
 
The supreme tragedy is still not seen that in Germany it was largely people of good 
will, men who were admired and held up as models in the democratic countries, 
who prepared the way for, if they did not actually create, the forces which now 
stand for everything they detest (Hayek, 1994, pp. 5-6). 
 
Totalitarianism is thus understood by Hayek as an unplanned and unintended outcome 
that comes about as a consequence of a process set in motion by well-intended, but ill-
advised, acts of government intervention in the economy.  
 
Commentators of the both the left and right have interpreted the Hayekian slippery slope 
argument as implying that any intervention in the workings of the free market economy 
threatens to lead to a descent into totalitarianism. Gamble (1996, p. 2), for example, 
wrote that in The Road to Serfdom Hayek ‘warned that even mild government 
intervention and redistribution could lead to totalitarianism’ (see also: Samuelson, 1970; 
Farrant and McPhail, 2009; Farrant and McPhail, 2011). It seems clear, however, that this 
is a misreading of Hayek’s argument in The Road to Serfdom and his other writings.  
 
Contrary, perhaps, to popular perceptions, Hayek (1994 [1944], Chapter 9; 1960, Part III) 
was himself an advocate of a modern welfare state, albeit one more limited than the 
contemporary norm, and he saw a positive role for government as the provider of goods 
and services where there were genuine market failures. In many respects Hayek’s 
position vis-à-vis the appropriate role of the state was not dissimilar to that taken by his 
London School of Economics colleague Karl Popper at about the same time (2006a and 
2006b [1945]). Although the social democratic leanings can be said to be more 
pronounced in Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, most of Hayek’s own 
practical public policy proposals at the time could easily be framed in terms of Popperian 
piecemeal social engineering. It is also the case that Hayek and Popper shared concerns 
about the role of a number of widely-accepted ideas in the rise of totalitarianism. 
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Hayek’s argument in The Road to Serfdom was intended to be a warning against socialist 
planning undertaken within the context of a mixed economy, not a warning against any 
economic intervention or the modern welfare state per se. As Lewis (2011, p. 317) has 
put it, Hayek’s intended target was ‘the then fashionable view that socialist planning 
constituted a middle way between fascism and communism, which would preserve 
individual freedom while at the same overcoming the deficiencies of the free market 
system’ (see also: Boettke, 2005; Caldwell, 2011).  
 
What Hayek objected to was what might be termed socialist planning: in particular, 
government direction of production and consumption either via deliberate control of 
economic activity or via the imposition of targets and/or quotas on supposedly private 
enterprises, and government attempts to ensure that particular individuals, groups or 
occupations received particular financial rewards, either via price or wage controls, or 
transfers via the tax and benefit system (for example: Hayek, 1994, Chapters 5-7).   
 
Although Hayek described the transition to totalitarianism as having its own internal 
dynamic, he was not an historical determinist. He did not, therefore, see the slide into 
totalitarianism as being inevitable once a certain point had been crossed. In fact, a whole 
chapter of The Road to Serfdom was dedicated to dismissing claims about the alleged 
inevitability of planning (Hayek 1994, Chapter 4).  
 
Hayek believed that the ‘road to serfdom’ was not inevitable if people came to realize the 
unintended consequences of the interventionist path and reversed before society had 
descended into totalitarianism: 
 
It is because nearly everybody wants it that we are moving in this direction. There 
are no objective facts which make it inevitable. (…) Is there a greater tragedy 
imaginable than that, in our endeavor consciously to shape our future in accordance 
with high ideals, we should in fact unwittingly produce the very opposite of what 
we have been striving for? (Hayek, 1994, p. 7).  
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In addition to affirming the unintended and tragic nature of the slide into totalitarianism, 
Hayek (1994 p. 68) suggested that this process came about because, as the degree of 
government intervention in the economy expanded, a point was eventually reached where 
state control became almost total:  
 
Once the communal sector, in which the state controls all the means, exceeds a 
certain proportion of the whole, the effects of its actions dominate the whole 
system. Although the state controls directly the use of only a large part of the 
available resources, the effects of its decisions on the remaining part of the 
economy system become so great that indirectly it controls almost everything. 
 
Hayek did not make explicit what that ‘certain proportion of the whole’ may be, but in the 
following paragraph he provided what can be interpreted as a more concrete benchmark: 
 
Where, as was, for example, true in Germany as early as 1928, the central and local 
authorities directly control the use of more than half the national income (according 
to an official German estimate then, 53 per cent), they control indirectly almost the 
whole economic life of the nation. There is, then, scarcely an individual end which 
is not dependent for its achievement on the action of the state, and the “social scale 
of values” which guides the state’s actions must embrace practically all individual 
ends. 
 
Hayek (1994, p. 75) argued that as the inescapable problems inherent in central planning 
became manifest, the tendency amongst a public that regarded interventionism as 
desirable would be to call for an ‘economic dictator’, someone whom people regarded as 
having the authority to get things done. The problems raised by each attempt at socialist 
planning constitute reasons that would justify further and more thorough interventions, so 
that a vicious spiral was generated even if this was not intended by the proponents of 
each interventionist policy when considered in isolation. It thus became increasingly 
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difficult to stabilize at a given level of intervention and avoid further descent down the 
slippery slope.  
 
For Hayek (1994, p. 117), the mixed economy was inherently unstable not just for 
economic reasons but also due to political and sociological factors: 
 
We have already seen that the close interdependence of all economic phenomena 
makes it difficult to stop planning just where we wish and that, once the free 
working of the market is impeded beyond a certain degree, the planner will be 
forced to extend his controls until they become all-comprehensive. These economic 
considerations, which explain why it is impossible to stop deliberate control just 
where we should wish, are strongly reinforced by certain social or political 
tendencies whose strength makes itself increasingly felt as planning extends. 
 
This happens, as Hayek elucidated further in a later work, partly because a government 
that embarks ‘upon planning for the sake of justice’ cannot then ‘refuse responsibility for 
anybody’s fate or position’ (Hayek, 1998, p. 118). As government expands the growing 
claims and pressures placed on it by the public will foster ever more interventionist 
measures. As the sphere of government intervention in the economy expands and the cost 
of being an outsider to the state apparatus correspondingly increases, the quest for 
security through government protection becomes a more and more powerful mechanism 
leading towards totalitarianism. In Hayek’s (1994, p. 143) words: 
 
Thus, the more we try to provide full security by interfering with the market 
system, the greater the insecurity becomes; and, what is worse, the greater becomes 
the contrast between the security of those to whom it is granted as a privilege and 
the ever increasing insecurity of the underprivileged.  
 
The levels of threat posed by different types of government interference with the market 
system in the context of the slippery slope argument are not discussed in depth, but 
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Hayek (1994, p. 38) did appear to have in mind a significantly wide reaching definition 
of economic planning and collectivism: 
 
The situation is still more complicated by the fact that the same means, the 
“economic planning” which is the prime instrument of socialist reform, can be used 
for many other purposes. (…) It is probably preferable to describe the methods 
which can be used for a great variety of ends as collectivism and to regards 
socialism as a species of that genus. 
 
It is interesting to note that Hayek (1994, p. 109) considered redistribution in order to 
‘secure a more just and equitable distribution of wealth’ to be ‘the only argument for 
planning which can be seriously pressed’ but simultaneously stated that the goal of 
distributing wealth according to a pre-established standard required that ‘we must plan 
the whole economic system’ and thus he suggested that the realization of this type of 
ideal would impose ‘more oppression than was ever caused by the much-abused free play 
of economic forces’. 
 
Considering all of the points made by Hayek, the slippery slope argument can be 
synthesized as the idea that the inherent dynamics of socialist planning of the economy 
generate a process whereby, after a certain point is reached, the degeneration into 
totalitarianism becomes increasingly difficult to arrest. While Hayek accepted that 
economic interventions that do not aim to guide production or consumption at the macro-
level, or do not attempt to determine the distribution of benefits and burdens throughout 
society, may be sustainable without risking totalitarianism, his thesis clearly implied the 
general instability of the mixed economy. A polity that seeks to engage even in relatively 
minor socialist planning, such as ensuring that a particular occupational group will enjoy 
a particular income, or setting goals for the production of particular consumer goods, will 
be propelled both by the economic problems associated with interventionism and by 
socio-political factors generated by interventionism, along the road to serfdom. The road 
to serfdom, as envisaged by Hayek, is impersonal, unintentional, and incremental.  
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A number of important influences on Hayek’s argument in The Road to Serfdom can be 
identified. Hayek was building upon and developing his teacher Mises’ (1981) critique of 
interventionism. In the bibliographical note at the end of The Road to Serfdom, Hayek 
(1994, p. 263) stated that ‘although unfashionable, the views of the author of the present 
book are not so singular as they may appear to some readers’ and he explicitly 
acknowledged Mises (1981) as his most important predecessor in this regard. From 
Hayek’s perspective, in the 1920s and 1930s Mises had warned that the Soviet Union was 
headed towards outright totalitarianism as its economic policies failed and that failure 
begot more stringent planning and control, and that a similar fate would befall the 
European democracies if they also pursued the unobtainable goal of socialist planning. 
The emergence of Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany seemed to be empirical evidence in 
favour of Mises’ thesis, leading Hayek to extend the analysis in his most famous work. 
 
It is also noteworthy that Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (2001 [1944]) was 
published at about the same time. Polanyi – curiously also influenced by the intellectual 
context of early twentieth century Vienna – put forth a substantially different analysis of 
the market economy and of the role of the state, but there are nevertheless striking 
rhetorical similarities with Hayek and also with Popper. While it would be beyond the 
scope of this paper to explore these similarities in depth, given the parallels between the 
works of Hayek, Popper and Polanyi it is certainly possible that Hayek’s arguments about 
the underlying threats to the free society may have been at least partly shaped by the 
Austro-Hungarian intellectual milieu at that time.  
 
A third significant formative influence on Hayek’s work was undoubtedly the positive 
view of government planning that became the norm amongst the British intelligentsia 
during World War II. By 1944 it was commonplace within such circles to believe that 
government could plan the peace in the same way that it had successfully mobilized the 
population to fight the war. The predominance of this view among well-meaning British 
intellectuals in the final years of the war was a powerful motivation for Hayek to write 
The Road to Serfdom (Caldwell, 2007).   
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The reality of the stability of the mixed economy 
 
Given that roughly seven decades have passed since the publication of The Road to 
Serfdom it would seem that a sufficient period of time has elapsed to enable comparison 
of Hayek’s argument with reality. Given the many nuances in the argument, developing a 
straightforward test would seem to be unreasonable, but it is nevertheless possible to look 
at the evolution of the societies Hayek was most focused on in order to evaluate his 
position with the assistance of empirical data and historical hindsight. For this purpose, a 
few simple but arguably effective metrics can be employed. 
 
The most obvious choice would be to look at indicators of economic freedom in the last 
seven decades and contrast that evolution with the slippery slope argument as presented 
by Hayek. Unfortunately, indicators of economic freedom only go back – at most – to 
1970 so additional indicators are required. Additionally, the empirical analysis presented 
herein is largely centered on Europe and North America. Although an exhaustive global 
analysis would be in some respects more enlightening, the lack of reliable comparable 
data counsels against such an enterprise. But given that Hayek’s argument was developed 
in the context of (and to a large extent explicitly directed to) Western democratic political 
regimes this may not be a serious limitation in terms of our aims; the empirical analysis 
conducted here is not global but neither was Hayek's construction and framing of his own 
argument.  
 
Considering that Hayek himself – as laid out above – suggested the use as an indicator of 
the proportion of national income subject to control by political authority, it seems 
reasonable to look at the long-term trends in general public expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP since the 1920s. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Considering the last nine decades, the data in Table 1 clearly evidences a long-term trend 
of growing weight of government expenditure for the ten countries included. It is also 
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interesting to note that from a long-term perspective this trend is not significantly 
different for countries in the sample that experienced dictatorial regimes (Germany, Italy, 
and Spain) compared to those that did not.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the long-term pattern appears to be one of relative 
convergence to values of government expenditure between roughly 40 and 60 percent of 
GDP, with a number of countries above the 50 percent threshold suggested by Hayek as 
the point whereby authorities would ‘control indirectly almost the whole economic life of 
the nation’. That this convergence is particularly salient since 1980 can be confirmed by 
the observation of the reduction of the coefficient of variation in the last three decades 
from 0.2 to 0.1. 
 
The ratios of general government expenditure to GDP for the ten countries considered 
thus provide evidence of a clear long-term trend of government expansion – as Hayek 
predicted. In the last three decades, the data also suggests a relative stability of 
government expenditure at around 50 per cent of GDP and a convergence towards values 
centered around that point. 
 
The question that then arises is whether Hayek was correct that the growth of government 
(measured in terms of general government expenditure as a proportion of GDP) would 
lead to a corresponding decline in individual liberty and a descent into totalitarianism.  
 
One intuitively plausible place to look for an answer to this question would appear to be 
Freedom House's (2012) survey and scoring of regimes in terms of political rights and 
civil liberties. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The data presented in Table 2 shows that all ten countries featured in Table 1 have been 
awarded perfect scores for political freedom by Freedom House (2012) in the most recent 
year on record. Not only are all ten countries ranked as 'Free' but all of them also have the 
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maximum score both in terms of political rights and civil liberties. While objections may 
certainly be raised against this sort of rating, these results are nevertheless fully plausible 
with what would be most people's intuitions about the nature of the corresponding 
polities. At the very least, one would be hard pressed to regard any of the ten countries as 
totalitarian by any standard definition. 
 
An additional indicator worth considering is economic freedom. For this purpose we use 
data from Gwartney et al. (2011) referring to the period spanning from 1970 to 2009 
(respectively the earliest and the latest year available) for the same ten countries.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Again, the data in Table 3 does not show any sign of a descent into totalitarianism. On 
average, for the ten countries considered there was an increase in economic freedom from 
1980 to 2000 and a slight decline from 2000 to 2009. As is the case with government 
expenditure, the reduction of the coefficient of variation for the economic freedom scores 
also suggests a convergence trend for the ten countries considered. 
 
One possible interpretation would be to argue that while government spending has 
significantly increased (as shown in Table 1) the countries in question have nevertheless 
preserved – or even expanded – a significant degree of economic freedom through other 
means, such as trade liberalization, monetary stability, and the protection of property 
rights.  
 
Hayek’s slippery slope hypothesis is therefore left in a very uncomfortable position: if 
government expenditure can sustainably account for half (or in some cases even more) of 
GDP with no apparent decline in economic or political freedom, and therefore no 
apparent signs of a slippery slope materializing, then very little of salience would appear 
to be left in the argument. 
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A defence of the slippery slope hypothesis might be to claim that while political and 
economic freedom indicators have remained at high values for the countries considered, 
these countries have, nevertheless, been transformed into totalitarian regimes or are on 
the verge of being so. But it is not clear what credible evidence might be marshaled in 
support of this claim. 
 
A second defence would be to accept that the countries considered have not become 
totalitarian regimes and are not on the verge of becoming so in the short term, but that 
nevertheless there is a looming and continuing totalitarian threat around the corner. This 
is somewhat akin to the way in which the slippery slope hypothesis continues to be used 
in contemporary political debate by some actors (usually on the right), such as the US 
talk show hosts who have advocated Hayek’s work as offering insight into the policies of 
President Obama.  
 
While this appears more plausible than the first defence, if one evenhandedly considers 
the data in Tables 1, 2, and 3 it seems a hard position to sustain. Considering that roughly 
seven decades have passed since the original formulation of the argument and that 
government expenditure has advanced to the extent outlined in Table 1, the question that 
arises is: if the descent into totalitarianism hasn't happened yet, when will it happen? 
 
Furthermore, if one considers developments in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in 
China, over the last couple of decades, the lack of force of Hayek's slippery slope 
argument is reinforced from a different angle.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
As evidenced in Tables 4 and 5, all of the countries coming out of authoritarian regimes 
moved into mixed economies with varying degrees of economic freedom but none of 
them can be considered to have anything resembling laissez-faire policies. 
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Additionally, as evidenced by the data in Table 6, these formerly totalitarian or 
authoritarian countries presently exhibit for the most part a significant degree of political 
freedom as measured by Freedom House (2012). 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
This means, firstly, that all of those totalitarian regimes proved to be – in practice – less 
stable than the mixed economies onto which the slippery slope hypothesis was projected 
as a source of instability and likely regime change. The data on China would also seem to 
reinforce our case as improvements in economic freedom have so far coexisted with a 
political regime that continues to be classified as undemocratic.  
 
Summing up the empirical evidence, from the perspective of the present it would seem 
that the mixed economy is, in fact, inherently stable, whereas laissez-faire and 
totalitarianism appear to be significantly less resilient. 
 
Considering the data and the historical experience of the last seven decades, the relative 
stability of the mixed economy seems hard to dispute. This raises an important theoretical 
question: why – contrary to Hayek’s slippery slope argument – do both laissez-faire and 
totalitarianism appear to be less stable than the mixed economy?  
 
The dynamics of rent-seeking and the failure of the slippery slope argument  
 
The empirical and historical data presented above provides a clear challenge to the 
slippery slope argument that forms the foundation of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom. The 
evidence shows that laissez-faire is inherently unstable – small governments tend to grow 
larger; that totalitarianism is similarly unstable – totalitarian regimes have not survived in 
the long-run; whereas the mixed economy is relatively stable – the mixed economies of 
Western Europe and North America whose futures most troubled Hayek have in fact 
17 
 
endured since the end of World War II and there is no evidence of an imminent threat of 
regime change.  
 
Paradoxically, perhaps, the failure of the Hayekian slippery slope argument can be 
explained using ideas from Hayek’s own work, in particular the notion of rent-seeking. 
Although Hayek did not explicitly use the term ‘rent-seeking’, he was well aware of the 
ability of special interest groups to use political processes to secure benefits and impose 
concomitant costs on others. In The Road to Serfdom, for example, Hayek (1994, p. 21) 
wrote of ‘the innumerable interests which could show that particular methods would 
confer immediate and obvious benefits on some, while the harm they caused was much 
more indirect and difficult to see’.  
 
As Boettke (1995, p. 10) has described, if a key principle of the public choice account of 
rent-seeking is the notion of dispersed costs and concentrated benefits, Hayek clearly 
understood and utilized this idea and in this respect Hayek understood that rent-seeking 
was an important part of the process of interventionism. However, the concept may also 
be an important part of an explanation of the instability of laissez-faire and totalitarianism 
relative to the mixed economy and therefore it may help to explain the failure of Hayek’s 
slippery slope argument. 
 
A basic tenet of public choice theory is that individuals will only engage in collective 
action, such as rent-seeking, when the anticipated personal benefits exceed the 
anticipated personal costs. The personal costs of political organization are likely to be 
determined by group size and group coherence: relatively small, homogenous groups, 
such as occupational or producer groups, are likely to be less-costly to organize than 
relatively large, heterogeneous groups, such as consumers (Olson, 1965; Olson, 1982).  
 
The returns of rent-seeking are said to increase up to a maximum point and thereafter the 
returns diminish. Rent-seeking initially generates increasing returns because there are 
initial start-up costs, such as establishing regulations or codes that can then be 
manipulated by different groups, because rent-seeking is self-generating as people seek to 
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defend themselves against the predatory actions of others, and because there is ‘safety in 
numbers’ as more people may be willing to rent-seek if others are engaged in similar 
activities. However, there will come a point where the possible gains available to new 
rent-seekers diminish as more people shift their activities from wealth-production to 
wealth-capture, with the result that there is less wealth available for political transfer. In 
short, the gains from rent-seeking would seem to be a classic bell-curve distribution, with 
the vertical axis representing the potential gains from rent-seeking and the horizontal axis 
showing the number of rent-seekers (Murphy et al., 1993; Olson, 1982).   
 
A laissez-faire polity will be one in which rent-seeking offers increasing returns that are 
likely to exceed the costs of acquisition for most organized groups. Although there will 
be start-up costs of rent-seeking, these are likely to be mediated by the scale of the 
potential gains available to the first rent-seekers. In a laissez-faire economy, there will be 
enormous potential to expand the government budget or the extent of government 
intervention in the economy by one initial item of regulation, price control or subsidy. 
The costs of such government expansion will be dispersed across the entirety of 
taxpayers while the benefits will be focused upon the smaller number of beneficiaries. 
Hence, for the first rent-seekers, the anticipated personal benefits will far exceed the 
anticipated personal costs. The dynamics of rent-seeking mean that the inherent 
instability of laissez-faire is explained and expected – we should expect minimal or small 
states to grow larger (Olson, 1982; Murphy et al., 1993). 
 
The logic of the increasing and then diminishing returns of rent-seeking may similarly 
explain the stability of the mixed economy. As rent-seeking increases and the state comes 
to dominate a large sector of the economy, the potential gains of further rent-seeking 
diminish to the point that the benefits of future rent-seeking are likely to be smaller than 
the costs of the political action required to obtain them. In this regard, Barry (1984, p. 63) 
referred to the notion of an ‘interventionist optimum’ to describe equilibrating tendencies 
in the process of government intervention in the economy. The evidence from countries 
such as Sweden – which after reaching unprecedentedly high levels of public expenditure 
substantially reduced it to still high but more sustainable levels – suggests that the 
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slippery slope process may in fact be countervailed by more powerful self-equilibrating 
characteristics of mixed economies. 
 
An additional problem with the slippery slope argument vis-à-vis mixed economies is 
that it implicitly assumes too much consistency on the part of government intervention. 
Hayek (1994, p. 78) argued that ‘planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the 
most effective instrument of coercion’ and therefore is ‘essential if central planning on a 
large scale is to be possible.’ But, even granting Hayek’s point about the effectiveness of 
dictatorship, it is conceivable that people may tolerate – or even prefer – comparatively 
ineffective methods of government intervention. Unless one assumes omniscience on the 
part of the public and/or planners – an assumption that could not be further away from 
Hayek’s own epistemological contributions – there is no reason to believe or expect 
interventionism as a whole to articulate itself coherently and to follow the means that 
would be most effective (or less ineffective).  
 
In fact, if one takes Hayek’s (1945) (and Mises’ (1981)) contributions about knowledge 
and economic calculation seriously, the most reasonable expectation would seem to be 
the opposite: in most practical instances, interventionism is likely to materialize as a 
series of inconsistent – sometimes even contradictory – policies that fails to enforce any 
coherent large scale ideal uniformly. Unless public policy is guided by an extremely 
strong, pervasive and univocal ideology, the severe epistemological limitations associated 
with interventionism should be expected to reinforce the relative stability of the mixed 
economy in democratic societies. In short, economic interventionism is likely to lead to a 
diverse and at times contradictory range of policies and programs that are likely to 
achieve their ends with varying degrees of success and thereby generate heterogeneous, 
rather than homogenous, demands of government.  
 
It is argued, then, that Hayek’s explanation of the processes that led to the development of 
totalitarian regimes was mistaken. Rather, for the most part totalitarian regimes were not 
created through a gradual and incremental process but came about through sudden power 
shifts; their persistence required a tremendous apparatus of oppression and ideological 
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propaganda and indoctrination. It may be possible to counter-argue that in several 
instances the upheavals that established totalitarian regimes built upon a previously 
existing interventionist momentum – in line with Hayek’s (1994, p. 6) view ‘that the rise 
of fascism and Nazism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding 
period but a necessary outcome of those tendencies’ – but if that is accepted as providing 
support for the slippery slope argument then one would expect many more such radical 
shifts to have occurred in the last seven decades considering the observed growth of 
government in all the established democracies since Hayek set out his argument.  
 
In terms of the dynamics of rent-seeking, totalitarian regimes may be characterized as 
‘rent-seeking societies’ in which the entire legal economy is run through central 
command and the distribution of income and wealth is largely determined by political 
favour (for example: Anderson and Boettke, 1997; Boettke, 1993). In a totalitarian 
setting, opportunities for political entrepreneurship are limited to a competition for 
resources that are already within the sphere of political control. At the point where rent-
seeking is most pervasive and productive activity is more severely curtailed, regime 
change is likely to become a more attractive alternative and stronger ideological and 
coercive controls are needed to maintain the totalitarian status quo. Indeed, this is what is 
suggested by Boettke’s (1993) analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union following the 
advent of Perestroika – the increased openness unleashed a wave of previously-repressed 
rent-seeking demands that could not be satisfied by the inflexible and impoverished 
economic and political systems. Totalitarianism is likely to correspond with a situation in 
which opportunities for capturing new rents are exhausted and therefore such societies 
should be considered less stable than societies in which opportunities for new rents exist. 
 
Hence, totalitarian regimes may find it much harder to cope with change and respond to 
dynamic events, meaning that the potential for popular revolts against such regimes will 
be greater than in democratic polities (for example: Anderson and Boettke, 1997, pp. 42-
3). For this reason, we should expect non-democracies to exhibit much greater levels of 
instability than democratic regimes that are better able to mediate and contain demands 
for change.  
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There are, then, good reasons to be cautious before accepting the slippery slope argument 
at the centre of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom. Even recognizing that Hayek’s intended 
target was socialist planning, rather than social democracy per se, and acknowledging 
that Hayek did not contend that totalitarianism was the inevitable outcome of any 
departure from laissez-faire, it nevertheless seems clear that Hayek’s account of the 
origins of totalitarianism and the concomitant instability of the mixed economy is flawed. 
The account of the dynamics of rent-seeking principally developed within the field of 
public choice economics provides a powerful counter-explanation of the stability of the 
mixed economy relative to laissez-faire and totalitarianism.  
 
Understanding freedom: economic and political 
 
It seems clear from the empirical evidence that Hayek’s basic thesis in the slippery slope 
argument was incorrect. As elaborated above, tendencies inherent to interventionism 
account for the most part for the stability of the mixed economy and the relative 
instability of both laissez-faire and totalitarianism. Unless very extreme and specific 
ideological conditions and practical circumstances are present that create a push for 
totalitarianism, it should be expected that the mixed economy will tend to be the more 
stable ‘solution’. Hayek’s failure to articulate this – the result of his inconsistent 
application of key public choice insights – led him towards a logical dead end and the 
uncomfortable position of arguing that totalitarianism was permanently lurking around 
the corner even in circumstances where that should have appeared rather unlikely.  
 
Curiously, however, Hayek’s predictions about the incremental expansion of the 
economic role of the state in a mixed economy proved to be quite accurate. The 
governments of most established democracies now spend in peacetime between 40 and 
50 per cent of national income, an unprecedented figure at the time that Hayek wrote The 
Road to Serfdom. The war economies of World War II did, of course, involve even higher 
state spending as a proportion of GDP, but this was motivated by the exceptional 
circumstances of the war and the exceptional forms of intervention it engendered (Higgs, 
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2006). What Hayek did not seem to anticipate, however, was that this expansion in the 
economic role of the state could take place without the creation of the kind of totalitarian 
apparatus that he believed would be necessary for the government to control even a 
relatively smaller proportion of economic activity.  
 
It may be argued that Hayek did not foresee that significant government intervention in 
the economy could be compatible with the preservation of political freedom because he 
employed a narrow conceptualization of freedom that led him to misunderstand the 
nature of and the relationship between economic and political freedom. 
 
Hayek (1960, Chapter 1) subscribed to the classical liberal conception of freedom in 
which people are judged to be free to the extent that they do not experience direct, 
coercive interference in their activities by an external force, such as the state. Freedom is 
therefore said to concern the size of the protected sphere of non-interference around the 
individual. According to this understanding of freedom, an expansion in the economic 
role of the state necessarily produces a corresponding reduction in individual freedom as 
that sphere of non-interference is diminished (see also: Kukathas, 1989, Chapter 4).  
 
The evidence presented in this article, however, suggests that the extent of the economic 
role of the state is only one among many indicators of economic freedom and may not be 
the most important. An important distinction in this regard must made between direct 
state expenditure and transfer payments. High numbers in terms of public expenditure are 
compatible with relatively low levels of direct government consumption if transfer 
payments – a notable feature of the contemporary welfare state – are relatively high. At 
the same time, the state often intervenes in economic decisions that are beyond direct and 
indirect state expenditure, for example through various forms of regulation. The precise 
extent to which the state intervenes in the private economic decisions is therefore a 
complex issue and would merit additional research on its own. But considering both the 
data and a qualitative analysis of contemporary regimes, it would seem that the state can 
have decisive influence over more than half of national product and the economy can still 
be considered ‘free’, in that there can be, for example, an absence of trade restrictions and 
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tariffs, no prices or incomes controls, and individuals may still freely choose their 
occupations.  
 
The evidence also suggests that the proportion of the economy in private hands can be 
severely limited while political freedom (in terms of freedom of speech, movement and 
expression, for example) can be preserved. This suggests that freedom is a more complex 
phenomenon than Hayek thought it to be.  
 
To understand the dynamics of the contemporary democratic state a more sophisticated 
understanding of freedom than that utilized by Hayek may be required. In particular, in 
order to explain the expansion in the economic role of the state and the concurrent 
endurance of political freedom, it may be necessary to develop a more nuanced account 
of the ways in power is exercised in the contemporary democratic state.  
 
To use Lukes’ (1974) terminology, Hayek would seem to have a one-dimensional view of 
power that only takes into account the observable and overt exercise of power between 
different groups and interests. A two- or three-dimensional view of power which takes 
into account the non-observable and covert interactions between different groups and 
interests – for example, when decisions are not taken, or the political agenda is 
determined by a dominant ideological frame rather than via overt conflict – may lead to a 
more subtle account of the relationship between economic and political freedom that 
engenders an appreciation that government can control large sections of the economy 
without having to resort to overt coercion to achieve this.  
 
Insight along similar lines may be provided by Foucault’s (1977, Chapter 3) use of 
Bentham’s Panopticon as an analogy for the operation of power in contemporary 
societies. Foucault described how within the Panopticon individuals modified their 
behaviour in accordance with the wishes of those with power without the necessity of 
direct force being used to change their behaviour. Inside the Panopticon each individual 
was always visible and therefore acted as if under constant observation, even when no 
surveillance was in fact taking place. The inmates of the Panopticon would be eventually 
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released back into society whereupon it was anticipated that as a result of their experience 
their behaviour would have been reformed so that they would act as law-abiding citizens 
without the need for continued surveillance or overt control. In this way, the Panopticon 
was a structure that ‘assures the automatic functioning of power’ because it led to the 
internalization and reproduction of the behaviour that the powerful demanded (Foucault, 
1977, p. 201). The inmates of the Panopticon, like the citizens of the modern democratic 
state, internalized the behaviour that their guardians wished to see, so that the exercise of 
power became a matter of personal routine without the need for overt coercion.  
 
There would seem to be a strong parallel between Foucault’s account of the Panopticon 
and the means via which the state exercises its substantial economic role in contemporary 
democratic states, where, for example, people are not forced ‘at gunpoint’ to pay large 
proportions of their salaries in income tax – rather income tax is automatically deducted 
from people’s salaries before they receive their pay, leaving them barely aware of its 
extraction. Likewise, the levy of indirect taxes may be even more opaque and therefore 
may require even less overt coercion to be successfully undertaken. The expansion of 
indirect taxation combined with long-term economic growth may well give rise to what 
could be described as a situation of 'fiscal anaesthesia' that facilitates the expansion of the 
state without involving the materialization of an overt coercive apparatus along the lines 
feared by Hayek. 
 
Similarly, people do not have to be directed by force to work for the state or in particular 
occupations deemed important by political actors – on the contrary, government positions 
are often highly sought after and reductions in the public sector workforce meet with 
popular demonstrations and protests.  
 
Lukes and Foucault both sought to challenge the belief that contemporary democracies 
were as free and as open as their supporters claimed by showing that power continued to 
be an important feature of such societies, even if it was exercised in more subtle ways 
than in authoritarian regimes. The invocation of Lukes and Foucault in the present article 
might be thought to rescue Hayek’s claim that economic interventionism compromises 
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freedom by showing that the economic expansion of the state has been accompanied by a 
corresponding growth in its political power, albeit that power is now exercised more 
subtly than was the case when Hayek wrote The Road to Serfdom. But Lukes and 
Foucault’s analysis does not show that social democracies are really totalitarian. Rather, it 
provides insight into the long-run sustainability of the mixed economy and its 
compatibility with what most people (certainly most liberals) would judge to be a free 
society. It seems clear that the formal and overt infringements of individual liberty that 
are associated with totalitarianism and that were Hayek’s principal concern in writing The 
Road to Serfdom have not accompanied the expansion of the economic role of the state. 
 
Hayek assumed that the state would always require (what might be termed) hard power to 
control a large proportion of economic activity, but in reality soft power has proved to be 
effective. The more subtle accounts of power provided by Lukes and Foucault would 
seem to offer a reconciliation of Hayek’s accurate prediction of the growth of the 
economic role of the state during the second half of the twentieth century and his 
mistaken forecast that this expansion would be accompanied by a decline in political 
freedom.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that Hayek’s slippery slope argument set out in The Road to 
Serfdom is empirically false. The failure of Hayek’s argument may be attributed to his 
failure to fully work out the dynamics of rent-seeking as applied to his analysis and his 
somewhat crude conceptualization of freedom and power in the modern democratic state. 
Contra to Hayek’s expectations, it would seem that government can grow to consume 
more than half of GDP without infringing basic political rights and civil liberties.  
 
The fundamental flaws in the slippery slope argument do not necessarily reduce the 
importance of Hayek’s overall contributions to political economy, but they surely do 
remove a major plank and a powerful rhetorical device for classical liberals. As noted by 
Barry (1984, p. 52), if correct, the road to serfdom thesis would constitute a ‘formidable 
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weapon in the armoury of the classical liberal’, which may explain why it has proven so 
popular and enduring in public discourse for so long. But it is time to recognize that the 
slippery slope argument – not withstanding its popularity – is misconceived and 
mistaken. If classical liberals wish to oppose the contemporary social democratic state 
they should not do so on the basis that it is a step along the slippery slope to 
totalitarianism – this claim is not supported by empirical evidence or theoretical analysis.  
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Table 1: Ratios of general government expenditure, including transfers, 
to money GDP at market prices (per cent) 
 
 1920 1937 1960 1980 2000 2010 
Austria 14.7 20.6 35.7 48.1 52.2 52.9 
Canada 16.7 25.0 28.6 38.8 41.1 43.5 
France 27.6 29.0 34.6 46.1 51.6 56.2 
Germany 25.0 34.1 32.4 47.9 45.1 46.8 
Italy 30.1 31.1 30.1 42.1 46.1 51.4 
Netherlands 13.5 19.0 33.7 55.2 44.2 51.2 
Spain 9.3 18.4 18.8 32.2 39.1 45.1 
Sweden 10.9 16.5 31.0 60.1 55.1 54.5 
UK 26.2 30.0 32.2 43.0 36.6 51.0 
USA 12.1 19.4 27.0 31.4 33.9 42.2 
Average 18.6 24.3 30.4 44.5 44.5 49.5 
Standard 
Deviation 7.8 6.3 4.9 9.1 7.0 4.8 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.42 0.26 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.10 
 
Source: Smith (2011, p. 47). 
Note: Data in Smith (2011) is combined from various sources and should be 
regarded as illustrative of long-term trends only. 
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Table 2: Freedom House ratings for 2011 
 
 
Freedom 
Status 
Political  
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Austria Free 1 1 
Canada Free 1 1 
France Free 1 1 
Germany Free 1 1 
Italy Free 1 1 
Netherlands Free 1 1 
Spain Free 1 1 
Sweden Free 1 1 
UK Free 1 1 
USA Free 1 1 
 
Source: Freedom House (2012, pp.14-18) 
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Table 3: Economic Freedom scores (1970-2009) 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 
Austria 6.5 6.4 6.8 7.4 7.5 
Canada 7.6 7.2 7.6 8.2 7.8 
France 6.4 6.0 6.8 7.1 7.2 
Germany 7.2 6.9 7.3 7.5 7.5 
Italy 6.3 5.5 6.5 7.1 6.8 
Netherlands 7.1 7.0 7.3 8.1 7.3 
Spain 6.6 6.0 6.2 7.3 7.0 
Sweden 5.3 5.6 6.6 7.4 7.2 
UK 5.9 6.3 7.6 8.3 7.7 
USA 7.3 7.5 7.9 8.5 7.6 
Average 6.6 6.4 7.1 7.7 7.4 
Standard 
Deviation 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.04 
 
Source: Gwartney et al. (2011). 
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Table 4: Economic Freedom scores (1995-2009) 
 
 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Bulgaria 4.6 5.3 6.9 7.2 
China 5.3 5.7 6.1 6.2 
Croatia 4.9 6.1 6.4 6.5 
Czech Republic 5.8 6.5 6.7 6.8 
Estonia 5.7 7.4 7.8 7.5 
Hungary 6.1 6.6 7.4 7.5 
Latvia 5.2 6.6 7.2 6.7 
Lithuania 5.1 6.3 7.1 7.0 
Poland 5.3 6.2 6.8 6.9 
Romania 3.9 5.2 6.8 6.9 
Russia 4.5 5.3 6.4 6.5 
Slovak Republic 5.5 6.2 7.7 7.5 
Ukraine 3.7 4.7 5.6 5.7 
Average 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.8 
Standard 
Deviation 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.08 
 
Source: Gwartney et al. (2011). 
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Table 5: Economic Freedom ranking positions (1995-2009) 
 
 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Bulgaria 107 109 54 35 
China 86 99 89 89 
Croatia 98 79 80 78 
Czech Republic 71 63 69 58 
Estonia 76 23 11 19 
Hungary 59 56 25 17 
Latvia 94 52 39 62 
Lithuania 96 70 41 45 
Poland 86 75 63 52 
Romania 119 112 61 49 
Russia 112 109 82 77 
Slovak Republic 78 77 17 14 
Ukraine 121 118 108 105 
 
Source: Gwartney et al. (2011). 
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Table 6: Freedom House ratings for 2011 
 
 
Freedom 
Status PR CL 
Bulgaria Free 2 2 
China Not Free 7 6 
Croatia Free 1 2 
Czech Republic Free 1 1 
Estonia Free 1 1 
Hungary Free 1 2 
Latvia Free 2 2 
Lithuania Free 1 1 
Poland Free 1 1 
Romania Free 2 2 
Russia Not Free 6 5 
Slovak Republic Free 1 1 
Ukraine Partly Free 4 3 
 
Source: Freedom House (2012, pp. 14-18) 
 
 
 
